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Abstract
We introduce and study reward sharing schemes that promote the fair formation of stake pools
in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance
of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain. Our mechanisms are parameterised by a target value for
the desired number of pools. We show that by properly incentivising participants, the desired
number of stake pools is a non-myopic Nash equilibrium arising from rational play. Our equilibria
also exhibit an efficiency / security tradeoff via a parameter that allows them to be calibrated and
include only the pools with the smallest possible cost or provide protection against Sybil attacks,
the setting where a single stakeholder creates a large number of pools in the hopes to dominate
the collaborative project. We also experimentally demonstrate the reachability of such equilibria
in dynamic environments where players react to each others strategic moves over an indefinite
period of interactive play, while showing how simple reward sharing schemes, such that inspired
by Bitcoin, converge to centralisation.
1 Introduction
One of themain open questions in blockchain systems research is developing rewardmechanisms that
incentivise honest protocol execution and decentralisation. Bitcoin came with a reward mechanism
that has received over the years significant criticism both in terms of its susceptibility to protocol
deviation attacks (e.g., selfish-mining [9] and mining games [14]) as well as its tendency to centralise
via the creation of mining pools. In fact the latter problem is so severe that mining pools have
exceeded 50% hashing power on occasion1 casting doubts on the resiliency and security of the whole
Bitcoin ecosystem. At the same time a new type of blockchain protocols have been suggested, called
proof-of-stake (PoS) [18, 15, 7, 4] that attempt to resolve the high energy expenditure problems of
proof-of-work (PoW) protocols like Bitcoin. The prime advantage of such protocols is that they
use the stake committed in the ledger as the point of reference for the algorithm that elects to the
next stakeholder to issue a block. Despite progress in the understanding of their security properties,
designing an incentive mechanism that promotes decentralisation remains open.
Our starting point is the observation that PoS protocols, with their ability to record how stake is
held, constitute a fertile ground over which one can designmechanisms for incentivising decentralised
behavior. We can abstract the problem that is to be solved as follows. Consider a society of agents that
have stake in a joint effort that is recorded in a ledger and want to run a collaborative project (which
might bemaintaining the ledger itself). Each player decides whether to participate directly or delegate
its stake to other stakeholders to act on their behalf. This gives rise naturally to stake pools (in parallel
to mining pools in Bitcoin). A first key observation is that Bitcoin’s reward mechanism will lead to a
centralized system. In Bitcoin’s mechanism pools receive rewards proportional to their size and it is
very easy to see that if rewards are awarded proportionally to effort after removing operational costs
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of the mining pool leader, the rational behavior of the participants is to all aggregate in one pool as
this would minimise costs and maximise the amount of shared rewards! (Refer to Section 7 for an
experimental validation of this fact). This state of affairs is natural since, in such situations, there
is a tradeoff between efficiency and trust. Efficiency is achieved by a dictatorial solution, in which
a unique delegate makes all decisions. At the other extreme, trust in the system is maximized by a
direct democracy approach when every stakeholder participates in the project proportionally to their
stake. Since Bitcoin-like rewards fail to provide decentralization, the question we ask is whether an
intermediate solution of representative democracy or polyarchy [5] in which there exists a relatively
large number of delegates can be achieved. A direct way to achieve a fixed number k of delegates is
to select k of them with probability proportional to their stake as typically suggested in many PoS
protocols [1, 15, 7, 12, 6].
Unfortunately there are a few technical problems with this solution: first, not all participants
are always present, want to, or have the capacity to act as delegates, and second, randomly selected
delegates that need to run the system may be inefficient. There are also other problems with the
randomized solution: no accountability for delegates is built into the system and therefore somebody
can try to subvert the system by simply paying some selected delegates to act in a particular way the
moment they become known.
Instead, in this work we put forth a novel stake pool approach: we set a target k of pool-leaders and
then an incentives-based mechanism will provide appropriately calculated rewards to all participants
to either propose a new stake pool or support one of the already proposed ones. The mechanism
allows all agents to allocate freely their stake to any pool they prefer and it provides rational incentives
for agents to assign stake in a such a way so that k stake pools will be formed in the end. The number
k of pools should be as large as technical considerations, such as a continuous network presence and
efficiency, allow (for instance it is a requirement that when any one of the k pool leaders transmits
a message, this is received by most other participants in a reasonable time frame — otherwise the
underlying PoS protocol will not operate properly).
There are certain properties that such a mechanismmust satisfy which are direct requirements of
the nature of the collaborative project of maintaining a blockchain, and there are desirable properties
that are part of a design philosophy. As an example of the former properties, we usually do not know
the number n of agents, and therefore the mechanism should not rely on such knowledge. As an
example of latter, a desirable property is that the formed pools are efficient in terms of cost and they
are of similar size.
A stake pool participates in the collaborative project through its leader; each participating pool
leader j incurs a cost c j (e.g., corresponding to the cost of running a server to execute a PoS protocol).
In order to incentivize the stakeholders and pool leaders to form pools and work for the collaborative
project, a reward scheme is used. In this work, without loss of generality, we will assume that there is a
fixed reward to be distributed among all pools at each stage of the maintenance process.
When an agent declares its candidacy to become a pool leader, we assume that certain aspects of
its profile, such as its stake and its operational costs, are announced to everyone else (e.g., in a PoS
setting this can be achieved by signing a “pool creation” certificate with their key2). We want these
aspects either to be verifiable, as for example is the stake committed to its own pool, or to be reported
truthfully. The latter means that the mechanismmust be incentive compatible.
Given the above, the setting that we consider is as follows: we assume that there are n agents or
players with publicly known stakes s = (s1, . . . , sn) and costs for running a pool c = (c1, . . . ,cn). We set
up a game so that the agents are incentivized to run pools or allocate their stake to pools created by
others. The game is determined by the reward scheme that determines the way by which the total
reward R is distributed to the pools and how the pool reward is distributed to the pool members.3 The
central question of our work is to determine reward schemes with desired properties.
2In fact multiple stakeholders may be allowed to back the same pool creation certificate by signing it.
3Expectedly, rewards will not be guaranteed but can only be claimed by pools that are operating properly in terms of
doing their part in the collaborative project.
2
We will focus on a simple class of reward schemes. Simplicity is an important property as com-
plicated schemes impose extra burden to players for selecting their best strategies. One component
of a reward scheme determines how the total reward is distributed to pools. We focus on the class of
reward schemes that allocate reward r (σ,λ) to a pool of total stake σ and allocated pool leader stake
λ, and we call r the reward function. The other component of a reward scheme determines how the
pool reward r (σ,λ) is distributed to the pool leader and pool members. It makes sense that the reward
for the pool leader is different from the reward for pool members to compensate the pool leader for
the cost it incurs by contributing to the collaborative project as well as to incentivize them to take
the initiative to form a pool. We focus on reward schemes that distribute the pool reward as follows:
the pool leader gets an amount to cover its cost of running the project as well as a fractionmj of the
remaining amount which we call its profitmargin. The remaining amount is distributed among the
pool members, including the pool leader, proportionally to the stake that they contributed to the pool.
Given a reward function r that belongs to the above class, the players will pick their strategy that
determines whether they will run a pool or not and whether they will allocate some or all of their
stake to pools created by other players. Natural questions about these games are: Do they have pure
equilibria? Can we compute them efficiently? Do the best-response dynamics converge fast?
Consider the game in which each player’s strategy consists of (a) the decision to create or not their
own pool, (b) their reward margin, and (c) the allocation of their stake to pools.
An important observation here is that the notion of Nash equilibrium for this game fails to capture
what we intuitively expect to happen. The reason is that at a Nash equilibrium the players do not
have to take into account the impact their selection will make on the moves of the other players.
In particular, all Nash equilibria (if they exist) will have reward marginsmj = 1 for a simple reason:
once the other players select their strategies and in particular the allocation of their stake, the best
response of a pool leader is to increase itsmargin asmuch as possible. However, a choice of such a high
reward margin will not happen in reality, since it will not result in a competitive stake pool that will be
able to attract member stakeholders. Similar situations occur in other games, such as the Cournot
competition [11]. The appropriate framework for such games is to consider non-myopic playing, i.e.,
consider equilibria in a setting where utility is defined in a non-myopic fashion, accounting for the
effects that a certain move of a player will incur anticipating a strategic response by the other players.
Our results. Let us first consider a reward function r (σ,λ) = r (σ,0) that depends only on the total
stake σ of the pool (note we assume without loss of generality that the stake of any agent or pool
belongs to (0,1) and represents the fraction of the total stake controlled by the specific entity) and it is
independent of the stake λ of the pool leader. The natural choice is to select r (σ,0) proportional to σ,
which has the nice property that it rewards all players proportionally to their stake (we call such reward
sharing, Bitcoin-like). However, it leads to dictatorial equilibria in which a single pool is created.
(Note that the cost of running a stake pool remains the same regardless its size). Although there may
be other equilibria, it should be clear that this reward scheme cannot achieve the goal of creating
approximately k pools because it is independent of the target k. Instead, a simple modification of this
reward scheme goes a long way in meeting this target. Consider the modification
r (σ,0)∼min{σ,z0},
where z0 is a constant and ∼ indicates proportionality with a multiplier that guarantees that the total
reward is sufficient to pay all pools4 (see Figure 1). If we call a pool saturated when its total stake σ is
at least z0, we can say that the reward function discourages oversaturated pools. By setting z0 = 1/k,
this reward scheme seems to provide the right incentives to create pools of size up to z0 = 1/k, which
naturally leads to k pools of equal size. However, this picture is to a large extent misleading because
the usual myopic best-response dynamics creates a single pool instead of k, because even with this
reward function, for a pool member a saturated pool is preferable to a pool whose reward is mainly
4A smooth function that approximates this reward function may be preferable to improve the dynamics of convergence
to equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Reward function for z0 = 1/10 with a0 = 0 (left) and a0 = 1/4 (right).
used to cover the cost of its leader. The good news is that, as we will show, dynamics of non-myopic
best response achieves the goal by leading to an equilibrium of k pools of equal size, given a reasonable
definition of an appropriate non-myopic notion of utility.
To evaluate the quality of a reward scheme, we should compare the resulting equilibrium with
an optimal solution. An optimal solution when all participants act honestly and selfishly is to have k
pools of equal size that are run by pool leaders of minimal cost. This would make the system efficient,
in both computational and economic sense. But besides efficiency, we want the system to withstand
attacks from some players that try to run many pools, even at a loss. A player that wants to subvert the
systemmay try to attack the system by creating multiple identities and declaring minimal cost (in
what sometimes is referred to as a Sybil attack [8]). We can prevent this attack, to a large degree, if we
can guarantee that players can attract stake from other players only if they commit substantial stake
to their own pool. This is precisely the reason for considering reward functions that depend, besides
the total stake of the pool, on the stake of the pool leader.
Ideally, we want the pools to be created by the players ranked best according to a0s j −c j (a linear
combination of their stake s j and their cost c j ), where a0 is a nonnegative parameter that can be
adapted to trade between efficiency and Sybil security. By selecting a0 = 0 we get the most efficient
solution, and on the other extreme, by selecting a very large a0, we can obtain a potentially inefficient
solution in which the pool leaders are the k “wealthiest” while Sybil attacks are totally de-incentivised.
The objective is to design a reward scheme that provides incentives to obtain an equilibrium that
compares well with the above optimal solution. On the other hand, we consider it important that the
mechanism is not unnecessarily restrictive and all players have the “right” to become pool leaders.
The natural way to accomodate this in our scheme, would be to use the above reward function
but apply it to σ+a0λ, a weighted sum of the total pool stake σ and the allocated pool leader stake λ.
With this in mind, the reward function becomes r (σ,λ)∼min{σ,z0}+a0λ. Again this reward function
goes some way towards meeting the objective but the best response dynamics, even non-myopic best
response dynamics, do not lead to equilibria that resemble the optimal solution and in particular, it
may create pools of very large size. The reason is that the influence of the stake λ of the pool leader
when a pool has not enough stake is very significant. Given that the ideal size of the pool is z0, one
way to alleviate this effect is to change the influence factor a0 to be proportional to the stake that the
pool has already attracted, that is to change the influence factor to a′0 = a0 σ−λz0 . But this creates the
minor problem that the influence factor is not the same for all pools, a very desirable property in order
to evaluate the threat of Sibyl-like attacks. The final touch in the reward function which resolves this
issue is to make the influence of the stake of the pool leader on the factor a′0 to disappear when the
pool has the desired size of z0. We therefore update the influence factor and the reward function to
r (σ,λ)∼σ′+a′0λ(1)
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where σ′ =min{σ,z0} and a′0 = a0
σ′ −λ · (1−σ′/z0)
z0
For this reward function we define a class of joint strategies that we prove (Theorem 1) that they are
non-myopic Nash equilibria and satisfy the following: (i) exactly k pools are created, (ii) the players
with the highest value P (si ,ci ) are those that form the pools, and in the case a0 = 0, those are exactly
the ones with the smallest cost. The players with the highest value P (si ,ci ) are these ones with the
most profitable stake/cost combination s ·a0 · R1+a0 −c , where R are the total rewards. For the definition
of non-myopic play we consider ranking the pools according to the rewards they are to distribute to
their members, assuming they are saturated (a quantity we call pool desirability). Then, non-myopic
utility assigns a payoff according to the strategy of a player calculating the rewards of the k most
desirable pools as if they are saturated. This type of play ensures that players “think ahead” and
anticipate the moves of the other players.
A downside of the above is that non-myopic moves may increase the stake of a saturated pool
above z0, in case a pool stakeholder decreases its margin below the value in the Nash equilibrium. This
motivates us to consider a more refined version of our game, where players act in two stages: in the
first stage, they determine the margins m⃗ and the stake λ⃗ that will be allocated to their potential pool
in case they become pool leaders, while in the second stage, they decide to create or not their own pool
and/or how to allocate their remaining stake among the available pools. We define an (approximate)
Nash-equilibrium of the outer game to ensure that no player is worse off in any of the equilibria
of the inner game. We validate our results for perfect strategies by providing an equivalent class of
approximate Nash equilibria of the outer game (Theorem 3) that have the two desired properties
(Theorem 2, Lemmas 4,5 ): (i) all the equilibria of the inner games determined by these joint strategies
form k pools of the same size z0 = 1/k. (ii) the pool leaders of these pools are the players with the
lowest cost when a0 = 0 and the players with the most profitable combination of stake and cost
s ·a0 · R1+a0 − c, when a0 ̸= 0 where R are the total rewards.
Dynamics. How the players are going to play such a relatively complicated game? We consider non-
myopic dynamics best-respond to each other moves in succession. To do so, the players compute the
desirability of each pool, which is the answer to the following question of the players: “if I allocate
a small stake x to pool j , how much do I expect to gain?”. In other words, the desirability is the
marginal reward of pool j provided that it will become a successful pool and obtain stake z0. A non-
myopic player then assumes that each of the k most desirable pools will increase in size to become
saturated and the remaining pools will end upwith the stake of their pool leader, and allocates its stake
accordingly. For pool leaders the situation is similar, but they have also to compute their margin. To do
so, they calculate themaximumpossiblemargin that still allows them to be one of the k most desirable
pools. The question then is whether these dynamics converge? how fast? and to which equilibrium?
We provide experimental evidence that under reasonable assumptions of the stake distribution (for
example, Pareto distribution) and of the cost distribution (for example, uniform distribution in an
interval), the dynamics converge quickly to our Nash equilibrium that has k saturated pools and
the characteristic that all pools are formed by the players that are ranked best according to the most
profitable combination of stake and cost s ·a0 · R1+a0 − c as predicted by the theoretical analysis.
Equilibria and incentive compatibility. The reward scheme has a Nash equilibrium in which the
reward is distributed fairly among all stakeholders, except for pool leaders that get an additionally
gain (Proposition 3). A nice property of this additional gain is that, all else being equal, it increases by
at most δx whenever the pool leader’s cost decreases by δx. This means that the reward scheme is
incentive compatible: no player will benefit by lying about its cost.
Application to PoS blockchains. Our reward sharing scheme can be readily applied to any PoS
blockchain that is suitably amended to facilitate as valid transactions stake pool creation certificates
and delegation of stake assertions, e.g., [15, 7]. We note that there are further considerations that need
to be taken into account when composing our reward sharing scheme with a distributed ledger. In
particular, in our analysis we do not consider how protocol deviations such as blockchain mining
games [14] may interfere with the application of the reward sharing scheme. Techniques such as
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the input endorsers mechanism introduced in [15] may be used to mitigate protocol deviations. At
the same time it is possible to use penalties, e.g., against a stake pool leaders’ stake, when the stake
pool is found to provably deviate from the protocol. For instance, in the context of the Ouroboros
protocol [15], this would amount to issuing two signatures for the same slot. Deincentivizing this type
of behavior with penalties leads to the “covert adversarial” setting that was analyzed in the PoS setting
and shown to provide beneficial outcomes in terms of convergence, e.g., see [15].
Related work. Our setting has certain similarities to cooperative game theory in which coalitions of
players have a value. In our setting the players have weights (stake) and they are allowed to split it into
various coalitions (pools). Our objective is to have a given number of equal-weight coalitions, which
contrasts with the typical question in cooperative game theory on how the values of the coalitions are
distributed (e.g., core or Shapley value) in such a way that the grand coalition is stable [21]. Actually,
the games that we study are variants of congestion games with rewards on a network of parallel links,
one for every potential pool. The reward on each link is determined by the reward function, which
essentially determines an atomic splittable congestion game. But unlike simple atomic splittable
congestion games [19], our games have different reward for pool leaders and for pool members. There
are two main research directions for such games: whether they have unique equilibria and how to
efficiently compute them [3]. Regarding the question of unique inner equilibria the most relevant
paper to our inner game is [20] (but see also [22, 2]) which shows that under general continuity and
convexity assumptions, games on parallel links have unique equilibria. However, the conditions on
convexity do not meet our design objectives and they don’t seem to be useful in our setting.
Our work is related to two aspects of delegation games, which are games that address the benefits
and other strategic considerations for players delegating to someone else to play a game on their behalf,
such as owners of firms hiring CEO’s to run a company. The first aspect is somewhat superficially
related to this work in pool formation the pool members delegate their power to pool leaders. The
second aspect which ismuchmore relevant to our approach is that delegation changes the utility of the
players (for example, by considering “credible threats” [23, 24]) or creates a two-stage game [26, 10, 25].
A typical two-stage delegation game is non-myopic Cournot competition [11] in which in the outer
game the firms (players) decide whether to be profit-maximizers or revenue-maximizers, while in
the inner game they play a simple Cournot competition [17]. Unlike our case, the inner Cournot
competition has a simple unique equilibrium which defines a simple two-stage game.
Another research area that is relevant to this work is mechanism design, because participants may
have an incentive not to reveal their true parameters, e.g., the cost for running a pool [19, 27].
With respect to PoS blockchain systems, a different and notable approach to stake pools is to use
the stake as voting power to elect a number of representatives, all of equal power, as in delegated PoS
(DPoS) [16]; for example, the cryptocurrency EOS [13] has 21 representatives (called block producers).
This type of scheme differs from ours in that (i) the incentives of voters are not taken into account thus
issues of low voter participation are not addressed, (ii) elected representatives, despite getting equal
power, are rewarded according to votes received; this inconsistency between representation and power
may result in a relatively small fraction of stake controlling the system (e.g., currently EOS delegates
representing just 2.2% of stakeholders are sufficient to halt the system,2 which ideally could withstand
a ratio less than 1/3), (iii) it may leave a large fraction of stakeholders without representation (e.g., in
EOS, currently, only 8% of total stake is represented by the 21 delegates5) Yet another alternative to
stake pools is that of Casper [4], where players can propose themselves as “validators” committing
some of their stake as collateral. The committed stake can be “slashed” in case of a proven protocol
deviation. This type of scheme differs from ours in that (i) stakeholders wishing to abstain from
protocol maintenance operations have no prescribed way of contributing to the mechanism (as in
the case of voting in DPoS or joining a stake pool in our setting), (ii) a small fraction of stake may
end up controlling the system while at the same time leaving a lot of stake without engaging in the
protocol operation; this is because substantial barriers may be imposed in becoming a validator (e.g.,
5Statistics extracted from http://eos.dapptools.info/#/block-producers on July 27th, 2018.
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in the EIP proposal for Casper6 it is suggested that 1500 ETH will be the minimum deposit, which, at
the time of writing is about $700K ); this can make it infeasible for many parties to engage directly;
on the other hand reducing this threshold drastically may make the entry barrier too low and hence
still allow a small amount of stake to control the system. As a separate point, it is worth noting that
for both the above approaches there is no known game theoretic analysis that establishes a similar
result to the one presented herein, i.e., that the mechanism can provably lead to a Nash equilibrium
with desirable decentralisation characteristics that include a high number of protocol actors and Sybil
attack resilience.
2 TheModel and Objectives
Notation - game
• n, number of players.
• R, total reward.
• si , stake of player i . It holds
∑n
i=1 si = 1.
• ci , cost of player i to form a pool πi .
• mi , margin of pool πi .
• λi , stake that player i will commit if he activates his own pool πi .
• a⃗i = (ai ,1, ...ai ,n), allocation of player’s i stake. ∑ j ai , j ≤ si .
• σ j , stake of pool π j : σ j =∑ni=1 ai , j . We denote the vector of pool stakes by σ⃗= (σ1, . . . ,σn). Pools
can have zero stake.
• r (σ,λ), reward of a pool with total stake σ and allocated pool leader stake λ. It holds∑
j r (σ j ,aj , j ) ≤ R.
• Potential profit of a saturated pool with allocated pool leader stake λ and cost c, P (λ,c) =
r (z0,λ)− c.
• We order the players according to P (si ,ci ). Player i is the player with the ith highest P (si ,ci ).
• S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ) = (a⃗i )ni=1, joint strategy regarding allocation given (m⃗, λ⃗). ai ,i ∈ {0,λi } and S(m⃗ ,⃗λ)i = a⃗i .
• ui , j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)), utility that player i gets from pool π j .
• ui (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)), total utility of player i : ui (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ))=∑nj=1ui , j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)).
2.1 The General Setting and Objectives
There are n stakeholders (aka players) with stakes s = (s1, . . . , sn) and costs c = (c1, . . . ,cn). We assume
that these parameters are fixed and known by everyone7. The players run a collaborative project (e.g.,
maintain a blockchain) and each player decides whether to participate directly or delegate his stake
to other stakeholders. The total stake that is delegated to stakeholder j forms a pool; we will call
such a pool π j , indexed by its pool leader j , and we will denote by σ j the total stake delegated to this
pool by all players, including the pool-leader j . ai , j will be the stake that player i allocates to pool
6See https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-1011.
7We revisit the issue of parameters in Section 5
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π j . The pools participate in the collaborative project through their leaders and we assume that this
participation makes each participating pool leader j to incur cost c j . This cost is fixed for each player
and does not depend on the size of the pool. To incentivize the stakeholders and pool leaders to form
pools and work for the collaborative project, we introduce a reward scheme. We assume that there
is a fixed reward R to be distributed among all pools. A reward scheme determines the way by which
the reward R is distributed to the pools and pool members, and the central issue of this work is to
determine reward schemes with desired properties. It makes sense that the reward for pool leaders
will be different than the reward of pool members to compensate them for the cost they incur by
contributing to the collaborative project and perhaps incentivize them to take the initiative to form a
pool.
We assume that the stakeholders want to maximize their own utility and that there are no external-
ities, i.e., outside factors that affect their behavior. This is an important point because in general there
are other issues at play that affect the reward of each pool, such as mining games. Here wemake the
simplifying assumption that these issues play no role in the pool formation game.
Our objective is to incentivize the stakeholders to form approximately k pools, where k is a given
integer. We further want no pool to have a disproportionally large size, so that no group can exert
disproportionally large influence. We summarize the model here. Formal definitions of the concepts
appear later.
• We set up an appropriate reward scheme to incentivize the stakeholders to form approximately
k pools. Pools are formed with stakes σ⃗= (σ1, . . . ,σn), some of them empty.
• The reward scheme distributes a total fixed amount R to the pools according to their stake
σi and the stake of their pool leader ai ,i . In particular pool πi gets reward r (σi ,ai ,i ) with∑
i r (σi ,ai ,i ) ≤ R. Note that we don’t have to distribute the whole amount R.
• The reward r (σi ,ai ,i ) of each pool i is shared by its pool leader and its stakeholders. The pool
leader first gets an amount c−i =min(ci ,r (σi ,ai ,i )). to cover the cost for running the pool, and a
fractionmi of the remaining amount (r (σi ,ai ,i )− c−i ), as compensation for running the pool.
This fraction is denoted by margin. The rest (1−mi ) · (r (σi ,ai ,i )− c−i ) is distributed to the
stakeholders of the pool, including the pool leader, proportionally to their contributed stake.
This leaves open interesting research questions regarding other approaches for sharing the
reward within each pool, such as marginal contribution and bargaining value.
• This defines a game for the stakeholders whose strategies consist of two parts: (i) their margin
mi as potential pool leaders and the stake λi that they commit to their potential pool, and (ii)
their delegation of stake, which is an allocation of their stake to pools.
Reward Schemes. A reward scheme is in general a function r : [0,1]2→R≥0 that takes the stake of a
pool and the stake of the pool leader allocated to this pool and returns the payment for this pool so
that:
∑
i r (σi ,ai ,i ) ≤ R.
It should be clear that for appropriate values of the parameters, there is incentive for the stake-
holders to form pools so that they can share the cost. Ideally, we want to find a reward function that, at
equilibrium, it leads to the creation of the desired number of almost equal-stake pools independently
of (i) number of players (ii) the distribution of stake and costs (iii) the degree of concurrency in select-
ing a strategy (iv) more forward-looking play, that is, non-myopic play as opposed to best-response.
For example, a player who considers creating a new pool can estimate howmuch stake he can attract,
given the current distribution of stakes and pools. This seems like an impossible task8, so we have to
settle for solutions that achieve the above goals approximately under some natural assumptions about
8Actually, here is a simple reward scheme that achieves all goals: give no reward to the pools, unless there are exactly k
equal-stake pools, in which case each pool gets reward R/k. However, we are interested in reward schemes that can lead to
a good Nash equilibrium starting at the state in which all players play no-participation and following natural symmetric,
almost myopic dynamics, such as repeatedly having a random player playing best-response.
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the distribution of stake and costs and about the equilibria selection dynamics. Intuitively the reward
function r has to satisfy two properties: it should increase fast for small values to incentivize players
to join together in pools to share the cost, and it should be constant for large values to discourage the
creation of large pools or equivalently to incentivize the breakup of large pools into smaller pools.
2.2 Definition of the Game
Wemake the assumption that every player can be the leader of only one pool and each player has
stake at most z0 = 1/k. Players with stake more than z0 or wishing to create more than one pool can
be thought of as a set of distinct players, see also Section 6 on Sybil attacks. Below, we will use the
notation: (x)+ =max(0,x), and [n]= {1, . . . ,n}.
Definition 1 (Strategy of a player). The strategy of a player i has two parts:
• (mi ,λi ), wheremi ∈ [0,1] is the margin and λi the stake that player i will commit if he activates
his own pool.
• S(m⃗ ,⃗λ)i = a⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)i that is the allocation of player i ’ stake given (m⃗, λ⃗). When the (m⃗, λ⃗) can be
inferred from the context we will use a⃗i for simplicity. ai , j ∈ [0,1] denotes the stake that player
i allocates to pool π j so that his total allocated stake is
∑n
j=1 ai , j ≤ si . This allows for stake
si −∑nj=1 ai , j of the player to remain unallocated. In addition a(m⃗ ,⃗λ)i ,i ∈ {0,λi }.
We describe the strategy of a player in two parts to be consistent also with our model of inner-outer
game that we will describe later.
Definition 2 (Pools). Given a joint strategy S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ), the stake allocated to a pool π j is denoted by
σ j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)), or simply σ j for a less cluttered notation. A pool π j is called active when player j allocates
non-zero stake to it, that is, aj , j =λ j > 0. Note that only player j can activate pool π j . If a pool π j is
active its stake is σ j =∑ni=1 ai , j , otherwise we assume that σ j = 0. A pool is called saturated when its
stake is at least z0 .
The restriction that only player j can activate pool π j , by allocating non-zero sate to it, is necessary
to prevent other players to force player j pay the cost c j of operating the pool without his consent.
Definition 3 (Pool Reward scheme). We define a reward scheme r as a function r : [0,1]2→R≥0 that
takes input the stake σi of a pool πi and the stake ai ,i of the pool leader allocated to this pool and
returns the total reward for this pool, as well as it satisfies the following:
•
∑n
i=1 r (σi ,ai ,i ) ≤ R, where R the total rewards.
• r (0,0)= 0. This means that an inactive pool will take zero rewards. Recall that we consider that
the stake of an inactive pool is zero.
•
d [(r (σ,λ)−c)· 1σ ]
dσ > 0, when σ< z0. This means that the reward function is increasing fast for small
values of total stake to incentivize players to join together in pools to share the cost. Recall
that the reward of a pool member with stake s of a pool with total stake σ, marginm and pool
leader’s stake λ is (1−m) · (r (σ,λ)− c) · sσ .
• ∀λ r (σ,λ) = r (z0,λ) when σ > z0. This means that the reward function is constant for large
values of total stake to discourage the creation of large pools.
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2.3 NonMyopic Utility
Recall that the strategy of player i is either to become a pool leader with marginmi by committing
stake λi and/or to delegate his stake to pools. We first point out that the notion of Nash equilibrium
for the game defined by the set of these strategies does not match our intuitive notion of stability
when players play myopic and do not take into account what effect their moves have on the moves
of the other players. Indeed, suppose that we have reached a Nash equilibrium in this game, that
is, a set of strategies from which no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. But there is an
obvious problem with this definition of equilibrium: at a Nash equilibrium (if it exists), all margins are
1. This is so, because by the definition of the Nash equilibrium the other players will keep their current
strategy and the best response of a pool leader is to select the maximum possible margin. There are
two problems here: first we definitely don’t want the margins to be 1, and second, the outcome is not
expected to be a stable solution anyway. If all margins are 1, a non-myopic player who is not a pool
leader can start a new pool with smaller margin which will attract enough stake to make it profitable.
We propose to study the non-myopic utility for the players that result from the following consideration.
Players do not consider myopic best responses but non-myopic best responses. Specifically, a player
computes his utility using the estimated final size of the pools instead of the current size of the pools.
The estimated final size is either the stake that pool leader has allocated to this pool or the size of a
saturated pool. The latter is used when the pool is currently ranked to be among the most desirable
pools and the former when the pool does not belong. A non-myopic player that considers where to
allocate his stake, wants to rank the pools with respect to the estimated reward at the Nash equilibrium.
But this reward is not well-defined because the Nash equilibrium depends on the decisions of the
other players. It makes sense then to use a crude ranking of the pools. Such a ranking can be based
on the following thinking: “An unsaturated pool" where I will place my stake will also be preferred by
other like-minded players if it has relatively lowmargin and cost, and substantial stake committed by
the pool leader (the last one is essential only when a0 ̸= 0) so the pool will become saturated. So, I will
assume that the stake of the pool is actually z0. On the other hand, if a pool has relatively high margin
and cost and/or not substantial stake committed by the pool leader will not grow and will lose also its
members as other unsaturated pools offer better combination of margin and cost. This motivates the
following ranking of pools:
Definition 4 (Desirability and Potential Profit). The potential profit of a saturated pool with allocated
pool leader stake λ and cost c is P (λ,c) = r (z0,λ)− c. Given a joint strategy S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ), we define the
desirability of a pool π j
D j (S⃗
(m⃗ ,⃗λ))=
{
(1−mj )P (λ j ,c j ) if P (λ j ,c j )≥0
0 elsewhere
(2)
Note that the desirability of a pool depends on its margin, the stake of the pool leader allocated to
this pool and its cost.
Definition 5 (Ranking). Given a joint strategy S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ), rank j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)) of a pool π j is the ranking of the
desirabilityDj (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)). The maximum desirability gets rank 1, the second maximum desirability gets
rank 2, etc. Again to get a less cluttered notation, we will write rank j instead of rank j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)) whenever
the joint strategy S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ) can be inferred from the context. Ties break according to the potential profit,
specifically the pool with the higher potential profit will be ranked higher; (with higher we mean
smaller rank) for convenience we assume that all potential profit values are distinct. The k most
desirable pools will be these ones with rank smaller or equal to k.
Given a ranking, we define the non-myopic stake of a pool to be either the stake allocated by the
pool leader or the size of a saturated pool. The first one is used when the pool does not belong to the k
most desirable pools and the second one when the pool belongs.
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Definition 6 (Non-myopic stake ). Define the non-myopic stake of pool π j by
σNMj (S⃗
(m⃗ ,⃗λ))=
{
max(z0,σ j ) if rank j ≤ k
aj , j otherwise.
(3)
To simplify the notation we set σNMj instead of σ
NM
j (S⃗
(m⃗ ,⃗λ)), σ j instead of σ j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)), rank j instead
of rank j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)) and aj , j instead of aj , j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)).
Definition 7 (Utility). The utility ui (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)) of player i from being a member of pool π j with non
myopic stake σNMj is
ui , j (S⃗
(m⃗ ,⃗λ))=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if π j is inactive (aj , j = 0)
(1−mj )
(
r (z0,λ j )− c j
)+ ai , j
σNMj
, else if rank j ≤ k
(1−mj )
(
r (λ j +ai , j ,λ j )− c j
)+ ai , j
λ j+ai , j otherwise.
(4)
The utility uj (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)) that the pool leader j gets from pool π j is
uj , j (S⃗
(m⃗ ,⃗λ))=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, if π j is inactive
r (σNMj ,λ j )− c j , else if r (σNMj ,λ j )− c j < 0
(r (σNMj ,λ j )− c j )
(
mj + (1−mj ) λ jσNMj
)
otherwise
(5)
The utility of player i is the sum of the utilities coming from all pools in which he participates as a
pool leader or a pool member: ui (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ))=∑nj=1ui , j (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)).
3 The Proposed Reward Scheme and its Properties
Given our target parameter k, we define the reward function rk : [0,1]2→R≥0 of a pool πwith stake σ
and pool leader’s allocated stake λ as follows:
rk (σ,λ)= R1+a0 · [σ
′+λ′ ·a0 · σ
′ −λ′ · (1−σ′/z0)
z0
],
where λ′ =min{λ,z0}, σ′ =min{σ,z0} and z0,a0 are fixed parameters. A natural choice is z0 = 1/k,
where k is the target of number of pools. For simplicity we will write r instead of rk .
We have: a0 ∈ [0,∞), (k ∈N), (k < n) and R ∈ R. Note that the total rewards R and a0 should be
selected such as it holds also P (sk+1,ck+1)> 0.
The next proposition shows that the proposed function is a suitable reward scheme.
Proposition 1. The function r (·, ·) satisfies the properties of a pool reward scheme, cf. Definition 3.
Proof. Follows easily as follows. (1)∀i r (σi ,ai ,i )≥0 , as a′i ,i ≤ σ′i . (2)
∑n
i=1 r (σi ,ai ,i ) ≤ R , as
σ′i−a′i ,i ·
(z0−σ′)
z0
z0
≤
1 and
∑n
i=1[σi +ai ,i ·a0]=
∑n
i=1σi +a0 ·
∑n
i=1 ai ,i ≤ 1+a0. (3) when σ< z0 it holds:
d [r (σ,λ)−c)· 1σ ]
dσ > 0. (4)
∀λ r (σ,λ)= r (z0,λ), when σ> z0 because we have σ′ =min{σ,z0}. (5) r (0,0)= 0, which means that
an inactive pool πi takes zero reward. Recall that when ai ,i = 0 we consider also that σi = 0.
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3.1 Equilibria Analysis
In this subsection we examine a game where players decide to create or not a pool and if not, how
much stake they will allocate to other pools. In addition they decide a margin for their potential pool.
Note that in this subsection we suppose for simplicity that a player can be either a pool leader or a
pool member. In the next section we will define amore refined version of our game that has two stages
and we will remove this assumption.
We define a class of strategies and we prove that they are non-myopic Nash equilibria of our game
(Theorem 1). This class has the following characteristics: exactly k pools of equal size are created
and the pool leaders are the players with the highest value P (s,c) (when a0 = 0 those are the players
with the smallest cost). Note that we use the term non-myopic Nash equilibria because players play
non-myopic by trying to maximize the non-myopic utility we described before.
Definition 8 (Desirability of a player). Desirability of a player will be the desirability of his pool. If he
does not have one, his desirability will be the desirability of a pool with his cost, the margin he has
chosen and his whole stake.
Note that all the players decide a margin even if they do not create a pool. The following lemma is
very useful and its proof follows directly from the definition of the reward function.
Lemma 1. The quantity (r (x, s j )− c j )/x as a function of x is increasing in [0,z0) and, if it is positive,
decreasing in (z0,∞). Its maximum is achieved at x = z0.
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the utility of pool members. We will give an
equilibrium that matches this upper bound.
Lemma 2. In every joint strategy in which some player j is not a pool leader, his utility is at most
maxl Dl · (s j /z0), wheremaxl Dl is the maximum desirability among all players.
Proof. It suffices to show that player j gets atmostDl
aj ,l
z0
from every pool l . The lemma follows directly
from this by summing for all l :
∑
l Dl
aj ,l
z0
≤ maxl Dl∑l a j ,lz0 =maxl Dl s jz0 . The argument that for every
pool l , player j gets at mostDl
aj ,l
z0
follows directly from the definition of the utility of pool members
when we consider the two cases depending on whether rankl is at most k andmore than k.
Specifically, when rankl ≤ k, by the definition of the utility of pool members, the utility to player j
from pool l isDla j ,l/σNMl ≤ Dla j ,l/z0.
When rankl > k, his utility is given by
(1−ml )
(
r (λl +aj ,l ,λl )− cl
)+ aj ,l
λl +aj ,l
≤ (1−ml ) (r (z0,λl )− cl )+
aj ,l
z0
=Dl
a j ,l
z0
,
where the inequality comes from Lemma 1.
The following proposition exposes an important property of the reward mechanism.
Proposition 2. At every joint strategy in which the player with the highest desirability is a pool member,
the player has a better strategy of creating a pool and committing all his stake at it. Consequently at
every Nash equilibrium, the player with the highest desirability prefers to be a pool leader rather than a
pool member.
Proof. Fix a joint strategy and let player j be the player with the highest desirability. Suppose that j is
not a pool leader. Then by Lemma 2, his utility is at mostDj
sj
z0
. When the player deviates and creates a
pool in which it is the only member, the utility will not decrease. Indeed, his utility in this case will be
Dj
sj
z0
+mjP (s j ,c j )≥Dj sjz0 . Therefore being a pool leader is always a better response to being a pool
member. Actually as we see, it is strictly preferable whenmj > 0.
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To simplify the notation we assume that the players are ordered in terms of potential profit, e.g.,
player 1 is the player with the highest P (si ,ci ).
Definition 9 (Perfect strategies). Wedefine a class of strategies, which wewill call perfect. Themargins
are
m∗j =
{
1− P (sk+1,ck+1)P (s j ,c j ) when j ≤ k
0 otherwise,
and the allocations are such that each of the first k pools has stake z0.
Note that when j ≤ k it holds rank j ≤ k.
The following proposition gives the utilities at perfect strategies and it follows directly from
Definition 7 of the non-myopic utilities of pool members and pool leaders and our reward function
described in this section.
Proposition 3. In every perfect strategy, the utilities of the players are:
ui = P (sk+1,ck+1) siz0 + (P (si ,ci )−P (sk+1,ck+1))
+.(6)
Furthermore the desirability of the first k+1 players is the same and equal to P (sk+1,ck+1).
Note that all the players get a fair reward, in the sense that it is a constant P (sk+1,ck+1)/z0
times their stake, with the exception of each pool leader i , who gets an additional reward P (si ,ci )−
P (sk+1,ck+1). This additional reward can be viewed as a bonus for the efficiency and security that the
pool leader brings to the system. We will show that every perfect strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the
game with the defined utilities.
Theorem 1. Every perfect strategy is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider first a player j with rank at most k. This player is a pool leader of a pool of size z0. We
show that none of the possible responses improves his utility:
• Suppose that the player decreases his margin. This increases his desirability so that the new
rank is still one of the first k ranks. Since the non-myopic stake remains the same9, this move
will decrease the utility of the player.
• Suppose that the player increases his margin. Since before the change the first k+1 players have
the same desirability, his desirability drops and his rank becomes larger than k. As a result the
player will be in a pool by himself and his utility can only decrease (Lemma 1).
• Suppose that the player becomes a pool member of other pools. By Lemma 2, his utility can be
at most P (sk+1,ck+1)s j /z0, which is lower that his current utility by P (s j ,c j )−P (sk+1,ck+1) (by
Equation 6).
We now consider a player j with rank higher than k. Again we show that none of the possible responses
improves his utility. Notice first that by changing his allocation of stake, it can only hurt his utility
since some of his stake ends up in pools with stake different than z0, which can only lower his utility
by Lemma 1. The other alternative is that the player becomes a pool leader. Since his rank is higher
than k, the (non-myopic) stake of the pool contains only his own stake, which by Lemma 1 is again no
better than the current utility.
In the first case of the above proof, the pool leader of a pool with stake z0 decreases his margin. By
the definition of the non-myopic stake, the stake of his pool remains the same. But because this pool
gets higher desirability, far-sighted pool members will prefer it and its size will increase beyond z0.
This raises the question whether perfect strategies are stable when the players play non-myopically
beyond the level captured by our non-myopic utilities. To better understand the implications of
far-sighted strategies, we consider a two-stage game in the next section.
9There is a possibility that non-myopic moves will increase the stake of the pool above z0. This is the motivation for
considering a two stage game.
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4 Two Stage Game
Definition of the game. In order to also capture non-myopic moves in response to pool leaders
changing margin or allocation, we define a two stage game, the “inner-outer game”. Similar non-
myopic play has already been considered in other games, most notably in Cournot Equilibria, as
is discussed in the introduction and related work. In this section we reuse non-myopic utility and
desirability as defined in previous sections, but when a pool has not been activated in the inner game,
we define its desirability to be zero. This gives us a more realistic result, because in practice only pools
that have already been created will be ranked. In addition we remove the assumption that a player can
be either a pool leader or a pool member. We order players by P (si ,ci ), and i will denote the player
with the ith highest value according to this ordering. We break ties in ranking in arbitrary ways, our
analysis will hold for all of them. In fact, we define two games here, the inner game, which focuses
on the allocation of stake, and the outer game, which focuses on the margins and on the stake that
potential pool leaders commit to their pools. In the outer game, player i decides on his marginmi
and on howmuch stake λi to allocate to his pool, should he decide to activate it in the inner game. So
a strategy of a player i in the outer game is a tuple (mi ,λi ) of margin and allocated stake. (m⃗, λ⃗) is a
joint strategy of the outer game.
In the inner game, the margins m⃗ and the stakes λ⃗, that potential pool leaders would allocate
to their pools, are given, and the strategies of the players are their allocations. So in the inner game
determined by (m⃗, λ⃗), a strategy of player i is S(m⃗ ,⃗λ)i = a⃗i , and a joint strategy is S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ). Note that if
a player i decides to activate his own pool, which means ai ,i > 0, then he is committed to allocate
stake λi to his pool, where λi is part of his strategy of the outer game. So ai ,i ∈ {0,λi }. We assume
that players decide their allocation trying to maximize their non-myopic utility. Recall that we have
assumed that each player can create at most one pool and that the utility that an inactive pool gives to
its members is zero. Note that each joint strategy of the outer game determines one inner game.
4.1 Definition of Equilibria for Inner and Outer Game
Definition 10. A joint strategy S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ) is a Nash equilibrium of the inner game defined by (m⃗, λ⃗) when
for every player j
u j (S
′(m⃗ ,⃗λ)
j , S⃗
(m⃗ ,⃗λ)
− j ) ≤ uj (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)), for every S′(m⃗ ,⃗λ)j ̸= S(m⃗ ,⃗λ)j .(7)
This is the standard Nash equilibrium notion when the players try to maximize their non-myopic
utility.
To define the non-myopic equilibrium of the outer game, let us temporarily assume that there
is a unique Nash equilibrium in every inner game. Then we define the utility of player j in the outer
game, where players have selected joint strategy (m⃗, λ⃗), as: uouterj (m⃗, λ⃗) = uj (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)), where S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)
is the unique equilibrium of the inner game determined by (m⃗, λ⃗). So a joint strategy (m⃗, λ⃗) is an
approximate ϵ-non-myopic Nash equilibrium of the outer game when for every player j
uouterj (m
′
j ,m⃗− j ,λ
′
j , λ⃗− j ) ≤ uouterj (m⃗, λ⃗)+ϵ(8)
for every (m′j ,λ
′
j ) ̸= (mj ,λ j ).
When there are multiple equilibria in the inner game, we define uouterj (m⃗, λ⃗) as the set of values
uj (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)), where S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ) is a Nash equilibrium of the inner game determined by (m⃗, λ⃗).
Let
uouter,upj (m⃗, λ⃗)=
{
supuouterj (m⃗, λ⃗) if u
outer
j (m⃗, λ⃗) ̸=,,
−∞ elsewhere.(9)
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In the same way we define:
uouter,lowj (m⃗, λ⃗)=
{
infuouterj (m⃗, λ⃗) if u
outer
j (m⃗, λ⃗) ̸=,,
−∞ elsewhere.(10)
Note that whenuouterj (m⃗, λ⃗) is not empty, it is a non-empty bounded subset of the reals and therefore al-
ways has both supremumand infimum: Upper- and lower bounds are given byR and (−max{c1, . . . ,cn})
respectively.
Definition 11. A joint strategy (m⃗, λ⃗) is an ϵ-non-myopic Nash equilibrium when for every player j
uouter,upj (m
′
j ,m⃗− j ,λ
′
j , λ⃗− j ) ≤ uouter,lowj (m⃗, λ⃗)+ϵ(11)
for every (m′j ,λ
′
j ) ̸= (mj ,λ j ).
4.2 Analysis
Nowwe will describe a set of joint strategies that (i) are approximate non-myopic Nash equilibria of
the outer game and (ii) have the characteristic that in the inner games defined by these joint strategies,
all the equilibria form k saturated pools. Recall that a pool is saturated when its stake is at least z0. The
pool leaders of these pools in these equilibria of the inner game are again the players with the highest
values P (si ,ci ). Note that if all players activated a pool of size 1/k with the same margin and their
whole stake, then the k pools with the highest potential profit (P (si ,ci )) would give the highest utility
to their members. The intuition for how the set of margins of these joint strategies is determined is the
following: The k players with the highest values P (si ,ci ) set the maximummargin they can, so that
their pools belong to the k most desirable pools (the pools with the highest desirability), no matter
which margins the other players set. Note that in this model, these players want their pools to have
strictly higher desirability than the potential pool of player k +1, because in a tie in ranking, they
might otherwise lose. In more detail: LetG = {1, . . . ,k} be the set of those k players with the highest
P (si ,ci ), ϵ= P (sk ,ck )−P (sk+1,ck+1) and ϵ1 = P (sk+1,ck+1)−P (sk+2,ck+2). By assumption ϵ,ϵ1 > 0.
For ϵ′ such that 0< ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1)} and α such that sk+1z0 <α< 1, we define m⃗∗(ϵ′,α) as
follows:
m∗i (ϵ
′,α)=
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
P (si ,ci )−P (sk+1,ck+1)−ϵ′·(1−α)
P (si ,ci )
when i ∈G ,
ϵ′·α
P (sk+1,ck+1) when i = k+1,
0 elsewhere,
and let λ⃗∗ be the vectors with λ∗i = si for i ∈ [n].
Note that margins are well defined because 0 ≤ m∗i < 1. We prove that: (i) For each ϵ′ such that
0 < ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1),ϵ1}, the joint strategies (m⃗∗(ϵ′,α), λ⃗∗) sk+1
z0
<α<1 are ϵ
′-non-myopic Nash
equilibria of the outer game. So we prove that for every ϵ′ as defined above, there is a class of joint
strategies that are ϵ′-non-myopic Nash equilibria of the outer game (Theorem 3). (ii) For each ϵ′ such
that 0< ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1),ϵ1} and α such that sk+1z0 <α< 1, all the equilibria of the inner game
determined by joint strategy (m⃗∗(ϵ′,α), λ⃗∗) form k saturated pools (Theorem 2). (iii) In the general
case (for any a0), the pool leaders of the k saturated pools described above are the players ofG , which
are the players with the highest P (s,c). If a0 = 0, the players with highest P (s,c) are the players with
lowest cost, so this achieves an optimum in terms of social welfare in this case, since it minimizes the
costs of running the system (Theorem 2).
First, we will state a basic lemma that we will use in the proofs of the following lemmas and
theorems. This lemma is a generalization of Lemma 2 and intuitively says that according to any joint
strategy of any inner game, the utility that a player takes from allocating stake s to other active pools is
upper bounded byDmax · s/z0, whereDmax is the maximum desirability of all the other active pools.
Formally:
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Lemma3. For every joint strategy of the outer game (m⃗, λ⃗) and for every joint strategy S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ) of the inner
game determined by (m⃗, λ⃗), it holds: For every player j that has allocated stake s to other active pools∑
i∈[n]-{ j }:i active u j ,i (S⃗(m⃗ ,⃗λ)) ≤ Dmax · sz0 , where Dmax is the maximum desirability according to S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
of all the other active pools.
Its proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 2. Recall that inactive pools in thismodel have desirability
zero and their members (if they exist) take utility zero from these pools.
4.2.1 Equilibria of the Inner Game
Theorem 2. For every ϵ′ such that 0 < ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1),ϵ1} and for every α such that sk+1z0 <
α< 1, it holds: A joint strategy S⃗(m⃗∗(ϵ′,α),⃗λ∗) of the inner game determined by (m⃗∗(ϵ′,α), λ⃗∗) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if it forms k active, saturated pools, whose pool leaders belong to G.
Proof. This can be proved by the following two Lemmas 4,5.
Lemma 4. For every ϵ′ such that 0< ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1,ϵ1} and for every α such that sk+1z0 <α< 1,
it holds: In an inner game determined by (m⃗∗(ϵ′,α), λ⃗∗), joint strategies S⃗(m⃗∗(ϵ′,α),⃗λ∗) that form k active
saturated pools, whose pool leaders belong to G, are Nash equilibria.
Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. It is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 5. For every ϵ′ such that 0< ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1),ϵ1} and for every α such that sk+1z0 <α< 1
it holds: In an inner game determined by (m⃗∗(ϵ′,α), λ⃗∗), joint strategies S⃗(m⃗∗(ϵ′,α),⃗λ∗) that do not form k
active saturated pools, whose pool leaders belong to G, are not a Nash equilibrium.
Proof Sketch. We take arbitrary ϵ′ such that 0< ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1,ϵ1)} and α such that sk+1z0 <α<
1 to prove the above statement. For simplicity we write m⃗∗ instead of m⃗∗(ϵ′,α). First, we prove that
there is no Nash equilibrium joint strategy S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) for which there exist one or more players inG that
have not chosen to activate their own pools. Second, we prove that there no Nash equilibrium joint
strategy S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) for which there exist one or more players ∉G that have activated their pools. Last, we
prove that there no Nash equilibrium joint strategy S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) for which there exist one or more players
who have allocated some of their stake to a pool with total stake more than z0 or for which there exists
some stake that is unallocated or has been allocated to an inactive pool. The whole proof is given in
Appendix B .
4.2.2 Equilibria of the Outer Game
Theorem 3. For every ϵ′ with 0< ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1),ϵ1} and for every αwith sk+1z0 <α< 1 it holds:
Joint strategy (m⃗∗(ϵ′,α), λ⃗∗) is an ϵ′-non-myopic Nash equilibrium of the outer game.
Proof. Its proof is given in AppendixC .
5 Costs and incentive compatibility
We assumed that the costs are publicly known, but it may be that the costs for participating in the
collaborative project are known only by the player. With privately known costs, the players may have a
reason to lie about their cost and the problem becomes a mechanism design problem. The objective
now is to design an incentive compatiblemechanism, i.e., amechanism that gives incentives to players
to declare their costs truthfully. Let’s consider the perfect Nash equilibrium of Section 3.1, in which the
utilities are given by Equation 6. Suppose that a pool leader j declared a different cost cˆ j , but remained
pool leader. Since P (s j , cˆ j )−P (s j ,c j )= c j − cˆ j , the player will not get any benefit from lying. To see
this, let uj (cˆ j |c j ) denote the utility when the player declares cost cˆ j instead of the true cost c j . Then
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Figure 2: example dynamics of our reward sharing scheme (c ∈ [0.001,0.002], a0 = 0.02)
Figure 3: example dynamics for the Bitcoin-like reward sharing scheme (c ∈ [0.001,0.002])
by taking into account the cost, we have uj (cˆ j |cˆ j )= uj (cˆ j |c j )−c j + cˆ j . Also from Equation 6, we see
that uj (c j |c j )−uj (cˆ j |cˆ j )= P (s j ,c j )−P (s j , cˆ j ). Putting them together we see that uj (cˆ j |c j )= uj (c j |c j ),
thus the player has no reason to lie. With similar reasoning, a pool leader has no reason to lie by raising
his cost so much that the rank of his pool increases above k. Similar considerations, show that no
pool member (i.e., with rank at least k+1) has an incentive to lie. This includes the special case of the
player with rank k+1. As a conclusion, we see that under the assumption that the players end up at a
perfect equilibrium, it is a dominant strategy to declare the true cost. Alternatively, we could adapt
the reward strategy to implement the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which applies to all
mechanism design problems. In this particular case, the VCGmechanism, would ask the players to
declare their costs c⃗, but the reward scheme would use a different vector of costs c⃗ ′ for the game. The
new costs c⃗ ′ will be such P (s j ,c j )= P (sk+1,ck+1)+δ, for all players with rank at most k and for some
tiny δ.
6 Sybil Resilience
As we have noted in the introduction, the objective of the a0 parameter is to mitigate Sybil attacks. In
general, the higher a0 is, the more impact the allocated stake of the pool leader has on the rewards of
the pool. Given that we have the equilibrium described before where the k players with highest value
P (si ,ci ) have created a pool, let us consider an attacker who has stake S < 1/2 and creates multiple
identities lying about his costs with the objective to obtain k/2 saturated pools with stake S/(k/2)
each one and control the system. Suppose the cost r ·ck/2 is declared for all pools with r ∈ [0,1). This
attacker would be deterred if it holds: S < k2 ·
(
λk/2− ck/2R · (1− r ) · (1+ 1a0 )
)
. Recall λk/2 is the stake that
player k/2 has committed to his own pool. The relation holds because the attacker should create k/2
pools with higher potential profit than the pool of k/2 player in order to succeed. As a result, we can
choose a0 appropriately to lower bound the stake of such an attacker. Note that a0 and total rewards
R should be such that it holds also P (sk+1,ck+1)> 0.
7 Experiments
Complementary to our theoretical analysis, we have also simulated a slightly modified version of the
game numerically (For details and results, see Appendix D).
Our goals were to verify the theory on the one hand and to get a feeling for the dynamics on the
other hand, when players take turns and make “moves” to optimize their individual strategies. A
typical simulation result can be seen in figure 2: Time progresses from left to right, the colorful bands
represent stake pools. We can see that starting from an initial state without any pools, pools are created
and destroyed in a complex fashion, before we finally reach a stable configuration of k = 10 pools of
equal size. For comparison we perform also a simulation with the Bitcoin-like reward sharing scheme,
cf. figure 3. As expected, the experiment shows that the system converges to a single dictatorial pool,
despite the fact that all players start with their own pools (the result is the same independently of the
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starting condition). We simulated the game over a wide range of player costs and values for parameter
a0 and always reached a “nice” Nash-Equilibrium eventually (mostly even a perfect one in the sense of
Definition 9), in full accordance with the theory.
Initialization We simulate 100 players, and we use k = 10 for the desired number of pools. We
assign stake to each player by sampling from a Pareto distributionwith parameter α= 2. Furthermore,
we assign a cost to each player, uniformly sampled from [cmin,cmax], where both cmin and cmax are
configurable.
Player strategies The following strategies are available for players:
• A player can lead a pool withmargin m ∈ [0,1].
• Alternatively, a player can delegate his stake to existing pools. He can freely choose howmuch
stake to delegate to each pool, and he does not have to delegate all of his stake.
Initially, there are no pools (so technically, all players play the second strategy and delegate to zero
pools). When it is a player’s turn tomove, he can freely switch to another strategy:
• A pool leader can keep his pool, but change his margin, or close his pool and delegate to other
pools.
• A player without pool can delegate differently or start a pool.
If a pool leader decides to close his pool, all stake delegated to that pool by other players automatically
becomes un-delegated.
Simulation step In each step, we look for a player with a move that increases the player’s utility by a
non-trivial amount10. If a player with such a move is found, we apply that move and repeat. If not, we
have reached an equilibrium. We have to deal with the technical problem that for each player, there is
an infinity of potential moves to consider. We solve this problem in an approximate manner as follows:
• For pool moves, instead of considering all margins in [0,1], we restrict ourselves to one or two
margins, namely 1 (to consider the case where the player plans running a one-man pool) and
the highest marginm < 1 that has a chance11 to attract members (calculated to a precision of
10−12 if such a margin exists).
• For delegation moves, we approximate the optimal delegation strategy using a local search
heuristic (“beam search”). Furthermore, we restrict ourselves to a resolution of multiples of
10−8 of player stake.
Avoiding myopic moves We have the problem of how to avoid “myopic” margin increases: It is
always tempting for a pool leader to increase his margin (or for a delegating player to start a pool with
a high margin), but such a move only makes sense if sufficiently few other players have incentive to
create more desirable pools during the next steps. To be more precise: If a player A contemplates
running a pool with marginm < 1, A wants players to delegate to his pool and saturate it (if he wanted
to run a one-man pool instead, the margin would be irrelevant and could be set to 1). Only pools with
rank ≤ k attract delegations and have a chance of becoming saturated, so running a pool with margin
m only makes sense if the pool can reasonably be expected to end up with rank ≤ k. This means that
when running such a pool, at most k−1 other players should have incentive to runmore desirable
pools.
10Specifically, we consider utility unew non-trivially better than utility uold iff unew > uold+10−8.
11Wemake this precise in the next paragraph.
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In order to determine whetherm satisfies this condition, we look at all other players. For players
who already run pools, we assume that they will continue running their pools and keep their margins.
For each other player B , we check whether there exists a marginm′ such that by creating a pool with
marginm′ and by assuming that that pool would have rankm′ ≤ k, B would increase its utility. Let
B have stake s, costs c and utility u. If B manages to create a pool with rankm′ ≤ k, then that pool’s
stake will be σ :=max(s,z0), and we can calculate its rewards r . Setting q := sσ and plugging in pool
leader utility, we are looking for the minimal marginm′ satisfying
(r − c)[m′+ (1−m′)q]> u.
We see that r > c is a necessary condition. For q = 1 (i.e. s≥z0),m′ = 0 is the obvious solution. For
q < 1, we get
m′ > u− (r − c)q
(r − c)(1−q) ,
and we pick u−(r−c)q(r−c)(1−q) as margin for player B . We end up with a list of pools, one for each player, and
we only allow A to consider his pool move with marginm if A’s pool would be amongst the k most
desirable pools in this list.
Explaining the results Outcome of each simulation is a diagram with various plots, visualizing the
dynamics, and a table with data describing the reached equilibrium. For the simulations reported
here, we have always used the same stake distribution (sampled randomly from a Pareto distribution,
as explained above) to make results more comparable (see figure 7).
dynamics Themost interesting andmost important plot, displaying the dynamic assignment of stake
to pools. At the end of each simulation, once an equilibrium has been reached, we expect all
stake to be assigned to ten pools of equal size.
pools The number of pools over time— this should end up at ten pools.
margins The evolution of pool margins. Instead of the margins themselves, their logarithms are
plotted.
ranks The evolution of pool ranks over time.
desirabilities The evolution of pool desirabilities over time. For better visibility, the difference to z0 is
plotted instead of the desirabilities themselves.
In the tables describing the equilibrium, the meaning of the columns is as follows:
player The number of the player who leads the pool. Players are ordered descendingly by their
potential P (s,c) (cost c , stake s). Our expectation is to end up with ten pools, led by players 1–10.
rk The pool rank. We expect our final pools to have ranks 1–10.
crk The pool leader’s cost-rank: The player with the lowest costs has cost-rank 1, the player with the
second lowest costs has cost-rank 2 and so on. For low values of a0, this should be close to the
pool rank.
srk The pool leader’s stake-rank: The player with the highest stake has stake-rank 1, the player with
the second highest stake has stake-rank 2 and so on. For high values of a0, this should be close
to the pool rank.
cost The pool costs.
margin The pool margin.
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Figure 4: low costs, medium stake influence (c ∈ [0.001,0.002], a0 = 0.05)
player rk crk srk cost margin player stake pool stake reward desirability
1 4 54 1 0.00156856 0.00898774 0.07704926 0.10000000 0.10154098 0.099073896587544
2 5 19 5 0.00121229 0.00125302 0.02052438 0.10000000 0.10041049 0.099073896587539
3 9 5 17 0.00108188 0.00088317 0.01216771 0.10000000 0.10024335 0.099073896587511
4 3 16 7 0.00120205 0.00063505 0.01694531 0.10000000 0.10033891 0.099073896587553
5 2 6 26 0.00108805 0.00053598 0.01075376 0.10000000 0.10021508 0.099073896587558
6 1 1 81 0.00100213 0.00047005 0.00613080 0.10000000 0.10012262 0.099073896587589
7 7 3 39 0.00105867 0.00047469 0.00898080 0.10000000 0.10017962 0.099073896587522
8 6 18 8 0.00121088 0.00042690 0.01635433 0.10000000 0.10032709 0.099073896587534
9 8 2 62 0.00103849 0.00026601 0.00693720 0.10000000 0.10013874 0.099073896587515
10 10 12 16 0.00115913 0.00011986 0.01224503 0.10000000 0.10024490 0.099073896587504
Table 1: low costs, low stake influence (c ∈ [0.001,0.002], a0 = 0.02)
player stake The pool leader’s stake.
pool stake The pool stake, including both leader andmembers.
reward The pool rewards (before distributing them amonst leader and members).
desirability The pool desirability.
We show the results of five examplary simulations with various costs and values for parameter a0
(which gouverns the influence of pool leader stake on pool desirability):
• lows costs and low a0, see figure 6 and table 1.
• lows costs and medium a0, see figure 4 and table 4.
• lows costs and high a0, see figure 5 and table 5.
• high costs and low a0, see figure 10 and table 6.
• high costs and medium a0, see figure 9 and table 2.
• high costs and high a0, see figure 8 and table 3.
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Figure 5: low costs, high stake influence (c ∈ [0.001,0.002], a0 = 0.5)
Figure 6: low costs, low stake influence (c ∈ [0.001,0.002], a0 = 0.02)
Bitcoin-like Reward Sharing Scheme As mentioned above, we have also simulated a “Bitcoin-like”
reward sharing scheme by making the following simplifications: There are no margins, no desired
number of pools k, no parameter a0, no ranking and no non-myopic considerations. A pool simply
gets total rewards equal to its stake σ. The pool operator gets his costs reimbursed, apart from that, all
rewards are split proportional to stake. So if a player i with costs ci and stake si runs a pool with total
stake σi , his utility ui is
ui =
{
σi − ci for σi ≤ ci ,
si
σi
· (σi − ci ) otherwise,
and a player j ̸= i delegating stake s j to that pool will get rewards
r (i )j =
{
0 for σi ≤ ci ,
s j
σi
· (σi − ci ) otherwise
from that pool and hence have utility uj =∑i r (i )j . As initial state, we use the “maximal decentralized”
one: Every player whose costs ci are lower than his stake si runs a pool, all other players do not do
anything. Our experiments show that we get the expected results for this simple game: If at least one
player has stake greater than costs and hence runs a pool, all players will end up delegating all their
stake to a single “dictatorial” pool.
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player rk crk srk cost margin player stake pool stake reward desirability
1 4 1 81 0.05010638 0.14071474 0.00613080 0.10000000 0.10030654 0.043136255076695
2 7 2 62 0.05192430 0.10917025 0.00693720 0.10000000 0.10034686 0.043136255076684
3 6 3 39 0.05293337 0.09216778 0.00898080 0.10000000 0.10044904 0.043136255076688
4 1 4 65 0.05373632 0.07443446 0.00683225 0.10000000 0.10034161 0.043136255076709
5 8 5 17 0.05409406 0.07262429 0.01216771 0.10000000 0.10060839 0.043136255076679
6 9 6 26 0.05440243 0.06500457 0.01075376 0.10000000 0.10053769 0.043136255076675
7 5 7 70 0.05441660 0.06050948 0.00662237 0.10000000 0.10033112 0.043136255076690
8 2 8 47 0.05465632 0.05736264 0.00835115 0.10000000 0.10041756 0.043136255076704
9 10 9 96 0.05621197 0.02124899 0.00569447 0.10000000 0.10028472 0.043136255076672
10 3 10 90 0.05651394 0.01480748 0.00597063 0.10000000 0.10029853 0.043136255076696
Table 2: high costs, medium stake influence (c ∈ [0.05,0.1], a0 = 0.05)
player rk crk srk cost margin player stake pool stake reward desirability
1 4 1 81 0.05010638 0.08665199 0.00613080 0.10000000 0.10306540 0.048370013523060
2 10 2 62 0.05192430 0.06158357 0.00693720 0.10000000 0.10346860 0.048370013523048
3 2 3 39 0.05293337 0.06181530 0.00898080 0.10000000 0.10449040 0.048370013523073
4 1 5 17 0.05409406 0.06962481 0.01216771 0.10000000 0.10608385 0.048370013523074
5 8 6 26 0.05440243 0.05109295 0.01075376 0.10000000 0.10537688 0.048370013523051
6 6 4 65 0.05373632 0.02636475 0.00683225 0.10000000 0.10341613 0.048370013523057
7 9 8 47 0.05465632 0.02320800 0.00835115 0.10000000 0.10417557 0.048370013523048
8 5 7 70 0.05441660 0.01072862 0.00662237 0.10000000 0.10331119 0.048370013523058
9 3 54 1 0.07842812 0.19512770 0.07704926 0.10000000 0.13852463 0.048370013523062
10 7 19 5 0.06061469 0.02573105 0.02052438 0.10000000 0.11026219 0.048370013523056
Table 3: high costs, high stake influence (c ∈ [0.04,0.1], a0 = 0.5)
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. We take an arbitrary ϵ′ with 0< ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1),ϵ1} and an atribrary αwith sk+1z0 <α< 1
For simplicity we write m⃗∗ instead of m⃗∗(ϵ′,α). Let us take an arbitrary joint strategy S⃗(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗) that
forms k saturated active pools, whose pool leaders belong toG . This means that players inG have
decided to activate their own pools with margins and the stakes determined by (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗) in the outer
game and that the other players have delegated all their stake to these pools, such that each pool has
stake z0. We will prove that this joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium of the inner game determined by
(m⃗∗, λ⃗∗), or in other words that no player can increase his non-myopic utility by changing his strategy,
given that the other players do not change their strategies.
• Let us take a player j that belongs toG . Recall that λ∗j = s j . The way in which he can change
his strategy is to dissolve his pool (make it inactive) and to allocate his stake to one or more
other pools whose pool leaders also belong to G or to leave it unallocated. Note that he can
also allocate his stake to an inactive pool whose pool leader decided not to allocate the stake
(determined in the outer game) to it, but in this case his utility will become zero. So we can
assume that the player in this case leaves his stake unallocated.
1. Let us take a strategy S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j of player j , according to which he dissolves his pool and
allocates his stake to one or more other pools whose pool leaders also belong toG . Intu-
itively this strategy will decrease player j ’s utility, because he will lose the rewards from
the margin of his own pool and additionally cannot increase his utility as a pool member
of the other pools, because no pool has higher desirability than his own pool. Note that a
player inG in the inner game determined by (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗) cannot choose to activate his own
pool and simultaneously be a member of another pool as his strategy, given that λ∗j = s j
and therefore aj , j ∈ {0, s j }. Formally: Regarding player j ’s current non-myopic utility, we
have:
uj (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))
λ∗i =si= uj , j (S⃗(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))
= (m∗j + (1−m∗j ) ·
s j
z0
) ·P (s j ,c j )
P (s j ,c j )>0> (1−m∗j ) ·
s j
z0
·P (s j ,c j )
= s j
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))> 0.
Note that rank j (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)) ≤ k, because only k pools are active and π j has positive desirabil-
ity, given that P (s j ,c j )> P (sk+1,ck+1)> 0 by assumption. If he chooses a different strategy
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S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j as described above, where he allocates some part of his stake s j1 to a pool πl and
the remaining part s j2 = s j − s j1 to a pool πl ′ , then we have :
uj ,l (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= (1−m∗l ) ·P (sl ,cl ) ·
s j1
z0+ s j1
= (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) ·
s j1
z0+ s j1
and
uj ,l ′(S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) ·
s j2
z0+ s j2
.
Note that by the description of S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗), both πl and πl ′ have stake z0, and their pool
leaders belong to G . Furthermore, according to both joint strategies (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
and S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗), at most k pools are active and have positive desirability (in (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j ),
player j has dissolved his pool), thus the ranking of all active pools is smaller or equal to k
(they belong to the k most desirable pools). So
uj (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) · (
s j2
z0+ s j2
+ s j1
z0+ s j1
)
< uj (S⃗(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)),
which means that player j cannot increase his non-myopic utility by this change. Note
that in the above proof, we did not assume anything specific about the stakes s j1 and s j2 .
By induction on the number of the pools to which j allocates stake, we can prove in the
same way that j ’s utility will not increase if he dissolves his pool. Note that the number of
pools to which j allocates stake does not have an impact on desirability and ranking of the
pools, because in all cases (i) there exist k−1 active pools with positive desirability ( j has
dissolved his own pool) and (ii) desirability, which determines ranking, does not depend
on pool size.
2. Let us consider the case where j leaves his stake unallocated. Then his utility will drop to
zero, which is smaller than his current utility uj (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))> 0.
3. Finally, let us look at the case where j leaves some of his stake unallocated and allocates
the rest to the other existing pools. Then by using the inequalities of the two previous
cases, we can prove that his utility will decrease.
• Consider a player j ∉G . According to S⃗(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗), this player has not activated his own pool. Then
the ways in which he can change his strategy are (i) to activate his own pool by allocating the
stake and margin specified in the outer game, (ii) to remove some parts of his stake from some
pools and allocate them to other already saturated pools, or (iii) to remove some parts of his
stake from some pools and leave them unallocated or allocate them to inactive pools. Recall
that again λ∗j = s j , so player j cannot activate his own pool and simultaneously allocate stake to
other pools in the inner game determined by (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗).
1. Consider the first case where j changes his strategy to S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j by removing all his stake
from the existing pools and activates his own pool as specified by the outer game. In-
tuitively, his utility will decrease, because if he activates his own pool, this pool will not
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belong to the k most desirable pools and thus will have non-myopic stake s j . Additionally,
the desirability of his own pool will be lower than the desirability of one of the active pools.
Formally: His current utility is
uj (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))= ∑
i∈[n]-j
u j ,i (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))
= ∑
i∈[n]-j
[(1−m∗i ) ·
aj ,i (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))
z0
·P (si ,ci )]
= ∑
i∈[n]-j
[
aj ,i (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))
z0
(P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))]
= s j
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)).
If he activates his own pool with his whole stake as specified by the outer game (λ∗i = si ),
then the ranking rank j (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j ) of this pool π j will be k+1. This holds because
the desirability of π j will be strictly smaller than the desirability of the k existing active
pools, whose pool leaders belong toG .
In more detail, if j = k+1, we have for all i ∈G :
Dj (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= (1− ϵ
′ ·α
P (sk+1,ck+1)
) ·P (sk+1,ck+1)
= P (sk+1,ck+1)−ϵ′ ·α< P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)
=Di (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j ).
If j ̸= k+1, we have for all i ∈G :
Dj (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j ) ≤
(
(1−0) ·P (s j ,c j )
)+
< P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)=Di (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j ).
As a result we have
uj (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
λ∗j =s j= uj , j (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= R
1+a0 · [s j + s j ·a0 ·
s j · (1− z0−s jz0 )
z0
− c j · 1+a0R ]
d [(r (σ,λ)−c)· 1σ ]
dσ >0,whenσ<z0∧ j∉G≤ P (sk+1,ck+1) ·
s j
z0
< (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) ·
s j
z0
= uj (S⃗(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)),
which means that his utility will not increase by activating his own pool.
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2. Now consider the case where j changes his strategy to S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j by removing some parts
of his stake from some pools and allocate them to two other, already saturated pools. We
will prove that j ’s utility will not increase in this case. Then we can use induction on
the number of pools to which he allocates stake according to his new strategy, so that
we prove the following statement: His utility will not increase by removing parts of his
stake from some pools and allocating them to other already saturated pools. Intuitively,
his utility will decrease, because the reward function has the property r (σ,λ) = r (z0,λ)
for σ > z0. Let s ji be the stake that j will remove from each pool πi and a′ j ,l , a′ j ,l ′ the
stake that he will allocate to pools πl and πl ′ respectively. Note that j ’s stake, that exists
in a pool πi after j removes s ji , is aj ,i (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )= aj ,i (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))− s ji and that the
stake that exists in the pools πl and πl ′ after he allocates the stake removed from the other
pools to them is aj ,l (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )= aj ,l (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))+a′ j ,l and aj ,l ′(S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )=
aj ,l ′(S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))+a′ j ,l ′ respectively. His current utility is
uj (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))= ∑
i∈[n]-j
u j ,i (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))
= s j
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)).
With this new strategy his utility will be
uj (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= ∑
i∈[n]-{l ,l ′, j }
[uj ,i (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )]
+uj ,l (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )+uj ,l ′(S′
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= ∑
i∈[n]-{l ,l ′, j }
[(1−m∗i ) ·
aj ,i (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))− s ji
z0
·P (si ,ci )]
+ (1−m∗l ) ·P (sl ,cl ) ·
a′j ,l +aj ,l (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))
z0+a′j ,l
+
(1−m∗l ′) ·P (sl ′ ,cl ′) ·
a′j ,l ′ +aj ,l ′(S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))
z0+a′j ,l ′
< uj (S⃗(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗).
So he cannot increase his utility by choosing this strategy. Note that the ranking of the
pools also does not change in this case, because the desirability does not depend on pool
size and the number of the active pools remains the same.
3. Consider the case where j removes part of his stake from some pools and leaves it unallo-
cated or allocates it to inactive pools: The utility in this case cannot increase, because as
pool member, his utility is always greater than zero.
4. Finally, consider the case where j does a combination of the two above strategies. Then
we can prove that his utility will decrease using the inequalities from the previous cases.
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B Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We take arbitrary ϵ′ such that 0 < ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1,ϵ1)} and α such that sk+1z0 < α < 1 to
prove the above statement. For simplicity we write m⃗∗ instead of m⃗∗(ϵ′,α). First, we prove that there
is no Nash equilibrium joint strategy S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) for which there exist one or more players inG that have
not chosen to activate their own pools. Second, we prove that there no Nash equilibrium joint strategy
S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) for which there exist one or more players ∉G that have activated their pools. Last, we prove
that there no Nash equilibrium joint strategy S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) for which there exist one or more players who
have allocated some of their stake to a pool with total stake more than z0 or for which there exists
some stake that is unallocated or has been allocated to an inactive pool.
• Consider a joint strategy S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) for which there exists at least one player j inG that has not
chosen to activate his own pool. We will prove that it cannot be a Nash equilibrium, because
j will increase his utility if he removes his stake from the other pools and activates his own
pool. Note that if j activates his own pool π j , then π j will belong to the k most desirable pools,
because according to the margins that are specified by the outer game, no pool activated by
player ∉G has the same or higher desirability than π j . This is proved in the second case of the
proof of Lemma 4. In addition to this, all the other pools activated by players inG have the same
desirability as π j , not higher. Regarding player j ’s current utility, by Lemma 3 we have:
uj (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))= ∑
i∈[n]-{ j }
uj ,i (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))
≤ s j
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))
Note that Dmax ≤ P (sk+1,ck+1)+ ϵ′ · (1−α) in this inner game, because even if all pools are
activated, the pools of players inG have the highest desirability, which is P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ ·(1−α),
as we proved in the second case of proof of Lemma 4.
If j activates his own pool, then his utility will become:
uj (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j ), S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
λ∗i =si= uj , j (S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j ), S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= (m∗j + (1−m∗j ) ·
s j
z0
) ·P (s j ,c j )
P (s j ,c j ),m∗j >0> (1−m∗j ) ·
s j
z0
·P (s j ,c j )
= uj (S⃗(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))> 0
• Consider a joint strategy S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) that is Nash equilibrium. We will prove by contradiction that
no player ∉G has activated his own pool. Specifically we will prove that in such a case, j will
increase his utility if he dissolves his pool and allocates his stake to other pools. Therefore this
joint strategy cannot be an equilibrium. By the previous case we know that in a joint strategy
that is an equilibrium, all players inG have activated their own pools and that these pools have
strictly higher desirability than π j . So π j does not belong to the k most desirable pools. The
utility of j according to S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) will be
uj (S
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))
λ∗j =s j= uj , j (S(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))
< s j
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)).
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This is computed in the same way as in the second case of the proof of Lemma 4. If he chooses a
different strategy S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , where he dissolves his own pool and allocates stake to pools whose
pool leaders belong toG , so that no pool has stake has more than z0, his utility will become:
uj (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )=
∑
i∈[n]-j
u j ,i (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
= ∑
i∈[n]-j
[(1−m∗i ) ·
aj ,i (S
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )
z0
·P (si ,ci )]
= s j
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))
> uj (S(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)).
• Let us suppose that according to joint strategy S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)), there exists at least one pool πl with
stake more than z0. We will prove that in this case S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) is not a Nash equilibrium. In more
detail, we will prove that a player j that is pool member of this pool πl can increase his utility by
choosing a different strategy S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j . This strategy will be to remove some of his stake, let us
say s j1 <min{z0−σi ,σl − z0},
and to allocate it to an unsaturated pool πi , whose pool leader belongs toG . Firstly, πl ’s pool
leader belongs toG , because in an equilibrium, as we proved in the previous two cases, only
these players activate their own pools. Recall that these pools have positive desirability. Thus
rankl (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)) ≤ k. In addition, we know that there exists an unsaturated pool πi , whose pool
leader belongs to G , because πl has stake more than z0 and there exist k pools with pool
leaders belonging toG . Moreover ranki (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)) ≤ k for the same reason as for πl . Furthermore,
desirability does not depend on pool size and thus:
rankl (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j ) ≤ k
and
ranki (S
′(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j ) ≤ k.
Regarding the current utility of j we have:
uj ,l (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))= (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) ·
aj ,l (S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))
σl
,
uj ,i (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))= (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) ·
aj ,i (S(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))
z0
.
If player j chooses a different strategy S′(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j ), where he removes s j1 from πl and allocates to
πi , then only uj ,l and uj ,i will change. This happens because j ’s allocations to pools other than
πi and πl will remain unaffected, and thus the rewards of the other pools will remain unaffected
as well. In addition to this, ranking is not affected as we again have k active pools. So
uj ,l (S⃗′
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )=
(P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) ·
aj ,l (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))− s j1
σl − s j1
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and
uj ,i (S⃗′
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )=
(P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) ·
aj ,i (S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗))+ s j1
z0
.
So
uj ,l (S⃗′
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )+uj ,i (S⃗′
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
j , S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)
− j )>
uj ,l (S⃗
(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗))+uj ,i (S⃗(m⃗∗ ,⃗λ∗)).
As a result, joint strategy S⃗(m⃗
∗ ,⃗λ∗) as described above is not a Nash equilibrium.
• A joint strategy where a player has unallocated stake or stake allocated to an inactive pool is not
a Nash equilibrium. This follows because the player can allocate his stake to a pool activated by
a player inG and obtain positive utility.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We take arbitrary ϵ′ with 0< ϵ′ <min{ϵ,P (sk+1,ck+1),ϵ1} and α with sk+1z0 < α< 1 to prove the
above statement. For simplicity we write m⃗∗ instead of m⃗∗(ϵ′,α).
We will prove that ∀i ∈ [n] and ∀(mi ,λi ) ̸= (m∗i ,λ∗i ), it holds that
uouter,upi (mi ,m⃗
∗
−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ) ≤ uouter,lowi (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗)+ϵ′.
Specifically, we will examine the following cases for i ∈G :
• (mi ,λi ), where 1≥mi >m∗i and 0<λi ≤ si =λ∗i .
• (mi ,λi ), where 0 ≤ mi <m∗i and 0<λi ≤ si =λ∗i .
• (mi ,λi ), wheremi =m∗i and 0<λi < si =λ∗i .
• (mi ,λi )= (mi ,0).
For i ∉G we will examine the case (mi ,λi ) ̸= (m∗i ,λ∗i ).
These are all the ways in which players can change the strategy described in the theorem. For
each case we will prove that in the inner game that is determined by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ), there is no
equilibrium in which the utility of i is higher than uouter,lowi (m⃗
∗, λ⃗∗)+ϵ′.
The cases are described below:
• First we will prove that no player i ∈G has incentives to increase his margin more than m∗i
in the outer game, regardless of λi > 0. By Lemmas 4,5 the only equilibria of the inner game
determined by (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗) are that ones where k saturated, active pools have been activated by
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players inG . So for every i ∈G we have:
uouter,lowi (m⃗
∗, λ⃗∗)
= uouter,upi (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗)
= (m∗i + (1−m∗i ) ·
si
z0
) ·P (si ,ci )
> si
z0
· (1−m∗i ) ·P (si ,ci )
i∈G= si −λi
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))
+ λi
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)),
where 0<λi ≤ si .
1. If an i ∈G increases his margin by choosingmi with P (si ,ci )−P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ
′·α
P (si ,ci )
≥mi >m∗i and
chooses arbitrary λi with 0<λi ≤ si , then:
uouter,upi (mi ,m⃗
∗
−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i )
≤ max{(mi + (1−mi ) · λiz0 ) ·P (si ,ci )
+ si −λi
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)
+ϵ′ · (1−α)), si
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))}
≤ m∗i ·P (si ,ci )+ϵ′+ (1−m∗i ) ·
si
z0
·P (si ,ci )
≤ uouter,lowi (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗)+ϵ′.
Note that in the best case there is an equilibriumwhere (i) i has not activated his own pool,
and his utility is at most siz0 · (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) by Lemma 3 or (ii) i has activated
his own pool, that belongs to the k most desirable pools, and has allocated the remaining
stake to the active pools with the highest desirability, which are the pools of players inG .
The utility that these pools will give him will be at most si−λiz0 · (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) by
Lemma 3.
If there is no equilibrium, recall that uouter,upi (mi ,m⃗
∗
−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i )=−∞.
2. If an i ∈G increases his margin by choosingmi with 1≥mi > P (si ,ci )−P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ
′·α
P (si ,ci )
and
chooses arbitrary λi > 0, then we can prove that there is no equilibrium in the inner game
determined by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ), where the non-myopic utility of i will be higher than his
current lower utility of the outer game denoted by uouter,lowi (m⃗
∗, λ⃗∗).
This happens because in the inner game determined by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ) we can prove
that there is no an equilibrium where player k +1 and the other players of G have not
activated their own pools (note that the desirability of πk+1 and of the pools whose pool
leaders belong to G , when they are active, are strictly higher than the desirability of πi ,
becausemi > P (si ,ci )−P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ
′·α
P (si ,ci )
).
So in the best case, in the inner game determined by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ) (i) there is an
equilibrium where player i has activated his own pool with rank worse than k and has
delegated his remaining stake (si −λi ) to pools whose pool leaders belong toG , or (ii) there
is an equilibriumwhere i has not activated his own pool and has delegated his whole stake
to pools whose pool leaders belong toG , which have the highest desirability.
We will prove that in both cases i ’s non-myopic utility will not be higher than his current
lower utility of the outer game denoted by uouter,lowi (m⃗
∗, λ⃗∗).
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As a result, uouter,upi (mi ,m⃗
∗
−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ) ≤ uouter,lowi (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗).
In more detail:
– In case (ii), by Lemma 3, his utility is at most
(P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) · siz0 < u
outer,low
i (m⃗
∗, λ⃗∗).
– In case (i), his utility is
[mi + (1−mi ) · λi
λi
] · (r (λi ,λi )− ci )
+ (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) · si −λiz0
d [(r (σ,λ)−c)· 1σ ]
dσ >0,whenσ<z0≤ P (λi ,ci ) · (0+ (1−0) · λiz0 )+
(P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) · si −λiz0
P (λi ,ci )≤ P (si ,ci ),m∗i >0< uouter,lowi (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗).
We can prove that there is no equilibrium in the inner game determined by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ),
where the players in G other than i have not activated their own pools, in the same way as
the first case of the proof of Lemma 5. Note that also in this inner game determined by
(mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ): (i) When these players activate their own pools, then these pools always
have rank less or equal to k, regardless which other pools have been activated, and (ii) no
other pool has strictly higher desirability and offers these players higher utility as members
than they get by running their own pools.
Now we will prove by contradiction that there is no equilibrium in the inner game defined
by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ), where the (k+1)-st player does not activate his own pool.
Let us suppose that there is a joint strategy S⃗(mi ,m⃗
∗
−i ,λi ,⃗λ
∗
−i ) that is an equilibrium of the inner
game and for which player k+1 has not activated his own pool. Then by Lemma 3 it holds:
uk+1(S⃗(mi ,m⃗
∗
−i ,λi ,⃗λ
∗
−i ))
≤ (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) · sk+1z0 .
Then if he chooses a different strategy S′(mi ,m⃗
∗
−i ,λi ,⃗λ
∗
−i )
k+1 where he activates his own pool, his
utility can be increased:
uk+1(S′
(mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi ,⃗λ
∗
−i )
k+1 , S⃗
(mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi ,⃗λ
∗
−i )
−(k+1) )
m∗k+1= ϵ
′ ·α
P (sk+1,ck+1)= P (sk+1,ck+1) · (1− ϵ
′ ·α
P (sk+1,ck+1)
) · sk+1
z0
+ ϵ
′ ·α
P (sk+1,ck+1)
·P (sk+1,ck+1)
= (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)) · sk+1z0 −ϵ
′ · sk+1
z0
+ϵ′ ·α
= uk+1(S⃗(mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi ,⃗λ∗−i ))−ϵ′ · sk+1z0 +ϵ
′ ·α
α> sk+1z0> uk+1(S⃗(mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi ,⃗λ∗−i )).
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The intuition behind this is that k+1 can activate his own pool, that belongs to the k most
desirable pools, and in this way can increase his utility, because of the margin that he will
take. Note that the desirability of his pool is worse than the desirability of pools whose
pool leaders are players in G , but the difference is small, and thus being pool leader is
more profitable for k+1 than being member of one of their pools.
Recall that in the inner game determined by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ), if player k+1 activates his
own pool, this pool belongs to the k most desirable pools, because P (sk+1,ck+1)−ϵ′ ·α>
P (sk+2,ck+2), where P (sk+1,ck+1)−ϵ′ ·α is its desirability. Note that the desirability of the
other pools ∉G is at most P (sk+2,ck+2) and that the desirability of πi , if it is activated, is
also lower than P (sk+1,ck+1)−ϵ′ ·α. So there exist at most k−1 pools activated with higher
desirability than that of the (k+1)-st player, which causes player (k+1)’s pool to belong to
the k most desirable pools when it is activated.
• No player i ∈G has an incentive to make his margin smaller thanm∗i , given that his pool already
belongs to the best k pools in all the equilibria of the inner game determined by (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗).
In more detail: If an i ∈G decreases his margin by choosingmi <m∗i and chooses an arbitrary
λi ≤ si , then in the best case there is an equilibrium of the inner gamewhereπi will again belong
to the k most desirable pools, and as a result:
uouter,upi (mi ,m⃗
∗
−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i )
≤ (mi + (1−mi ) · λiz0 ) ·P (si ,ci )
+ si −λi
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))
mi<m∗i< (m∗i + (1−m∗i ) ·
λi
z0
) ·P (si ,ci )
+ si −λi
z0
· (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))
≤ uouter,lowi (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗).
• No player i ∈G has incentives to commit less stake to his pool in the outer game, because the
other existing pools have the same desirability and will not give it higher utility. In more detail:
If a player i ∈G chooses margin equal tom∗i , but λi < si =λ∗i , then in the best case his pool will
belong to the k most desirable pools, and using Lemma 3, we will have:
uouter,upi (m⃗
∗,λi , λ⃗∗−i ) ≤ (m∗i + (1−m∗i ) ·
λi
z0
) ·P (si ,ci )
+ si −λi
z0
(P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α))
≤ uouter,lowi (m⃗∗, λ⃗∗).
• Player i ∈ G has no incentives to set λi = 0, because using Lemma 3, we can prove that in
any equilibrium of the inner game determined by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,0, λ⃗
∗
−i ), where he has not activated
his own pool, as λi = 0, his utility for being a pool member of other pools will be lower than
uouter,lowi (m⃗
∗, λ⃗∗).
• Player i ̸∈G has no incentives to choose margin mi ̸=m∗i or to commit stake λi less than si ,
because we can prove in the same way as in the second case of the proof of Lemma 5 that in the
inner game determined by (mi ,m⃗∗−i ,λi , λ⃗
∗
−i ), there is no equilibrium where he has activated his
own pool, so margin and stake committed to his own pool do not have an impact on his utility,
which by Lemma 3 will be at most siz0 · (P (sk+1,ck+1)+ϵ′ · (1−α)). For this proof, it is important
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player rk crk srk cost margin player stake pool stake reward desirability
1 3 54 1 0.00156856 0.02828919 0.07704926 0.10000000 0.10385246 0.099390372362847
2 4 73 2 0.00173639 0.00742961 0.03741446 0.10000000 0.10187072 0.099390372362843
3 7 19 5 0.00121229 0.00424342 0.02052438 0.10000000 0.10102622 0.099390372362829
4 9 52 3 0.00156655 0.00297511 0.02507001 0.10000000 0.10125350 0.099390372362814
5 2 16 7 0.00120205 0.00255748 0.01694531 0.10000000 0.10084727 0.099390372362863
6 10 18 8 0.00121088 0.00217321 0.01635433 0.10000000 0.10081772 0.099390372362800
7 8 5 17 0.00108188 0.00136779 0.01216771 0.10000000 0.10060839 0.099390372362825
8 1 45 6 0.00152048 0.00090705 0.02002176 0.10000000 0.10100109 0.099390372362877
9 5 6 26 0.00108805 0.00059595 0.01075376 0.10000000 0.10053769 0.099390372362835
10 6 12 16 0.00115913 0.00063097 0.01224503 0.10000000 0.10061225 0.099390372362834
Table 4: low costs, medium stake influence (c ∈ [0.001,0.002], a0 = 0.05)
player rk crk srk cost margin player stake pool stake reward desirability
1 8 54 1 0.00156856 0.23109808 0.07704926 0.10000000 0.13852463 0.105305784121818
2 1 73 2 0.00173639 0.09972617 0.03741446 0.10000000 0.11870723 0.105305784121865
3 3 52 3 0.00156655 0.05102956 0.02507001 0.10000000 0.11253500 0.105305784121842
4 2 19 5 0.00121229 0.03433392 0.02052438 0.10000000 0.11026219 0.105305784121863
5 7 80 4 0.00181011 0.03273015 0.02135839 0.10000000 0.11067919 0.105305784121826
6 6 45 6 0.00152048 0.02935389 0.02002176 0.10000000 0.11001088 0.105305784121833
7 10 16 7 0.00120205 0.01831648 0.01694531 0.10000000 0.10847266 0.105305784121808
8 4 18 8 0.00121088 0.01552360 0.01635433 0.10000000 0.10817716 0.105305784121835
9 5 64 10 0.00163171 0.00394146 0.01470840 0.10000000 0.10735420 0.105305784121835
10 9 82 9 0.00181572 0.00298747 0.01487410 0.10000000 0.10743705 0.105305784121813
Table 5: low costs, high stake influence (c ∈ [0.001,0.002], a0 = 0.5)
that players ∉G cannot lower the desirability of the pools activated by players inG by allocating
stake to them strategically, because desirability does not depend on pool size. In addition to
that, even if player k+1 sets margin zero, the desirability of his pool remains strictly lower than
the desirability of the pools of all the players ofG .
D Experimental Results
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player rk crk srk cost margin player stake pool stake reward desirability
1 4 1 81 0.05010638 0.14091746 0.00613080 0.10000000 0.10012262 0.042968072279390
2 8 2 62 0.05192430 0.10881324 0.00693720 0.10000000 0.10013874 0.042968072279376
3 3 3 39 0.05293337 0.09055053 0.00898080 0.10000000 0.10017962 0.042968072279392
4 10 4 65 0.05373632 0.07397050 0.00683225 0.10000000 0.10013665 0.042968072279365
5 1 5 17 0.05409406 0.06893326 0.01216771 0.10000000 0.10024335 0.042968072279396
6 9 6 26 0.05440243 0.06209143 0.01075376 0.10000000 0.10021508 0.042968072279369
7 7 7 70 0.05441660 0.06010553 0.00662237 0.10000000 0.10013245 0.042968072279379
8 5 8 47 0.05465632 0.05586892 0.00835115 0.10000000 0.10016702 0.042968072279383
9 6 9 96 0.05621197 0.02127128 0.00569447 0.10000000 0.10011389 0.042968072279383
10 2 10 90 0.05651394 0.01461751 0.00597063 0.10000000 0.10011941 0.042968072279394
Table 6: high costs, low stake influence (c ∈ [0.05,0.1], a0 = 0.02)
Figure 8: high costs, high stake influence (c ∈ [0.05,0.1], a0 = 0.5)
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Figure 9: high costs, medium stake influence (c ∈ [0.05,0.1], a0 = 0.05)
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Figure 10: high costs, low stake influence (c ∈ [0.05,0.1], a0 = 0.02)
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